There is a growing body of literature in our industry that addresses the use of portfolio management techniques to find "optimum" mixes of projects that meet company goals while managing risk. These investigations usually start by describing "risk" in some manner, then proceed to illustrate how combinations of properties can be chosen that minimize this risk function subject to the other goals of the company.
This type of analysis is valid and useful, and forms the backbone of project portfolio management. However, when dealing with risk and probability concepts it is easy to lose sight that specific events will occur in time, and that the portfolio must include enough flexibility to allow reaction to and recovery from these events.
Specifically, acceptable portfolio results may depend on a small number of projects performing at a certain level. Because the chance of these important projects not performing at this level may be relatively small, the risk is deemed "acceptable". If one of the projects subsequently fails to perform, what was once "acceptable risk" can become an exercise in salvaging a year or even saving a company.
In this paper, we will show how portfolio management techniques can be used to plan a portfolio robust enough to recover from a potential future disaster. We will demonstrate with examples how the techniques can lead us to make investment choices today that might not be obvious if projects are evaluated solely using their expected values. These choices, if made judiciously, can provide insurance against possible future downside.
Introduction
Most strategic planning and investment analyses use the concept of expected value to consolidate results and u nderstand them in aggregate. Expected value is a powerful concept, but can lead the analyst astray if not used judiciously. We refer specifically to instances when a negative outcome is unlikely enough to be overshadowed when placed in an expected value context, but, should it occur, would significantly harm a company's chances of achieving its goals.
In this paper, we will show how a portfolio management model, when used in an SPE 84331
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investigative manner, can be used to reduce potential downside in these types of situations.
We will start by defining the terms contained in our title, "Disaster Insurance using Portfolio Management Techniques":
• "Disaster" -an event that would make it highly unlikely that the company would meet its stated goals, and that this shortfall would be significant. While disaster might infer company endangering loss, this is not necessarily so, and neither of our examples will be that severe.
• "Insurance" -a relatively small payment made to avoid a potentially much larger, but less likely, cost in the future. In the context of portfolio management, insurance means finding a portfolio of projects that has somewhat less value or lower annual values for some of its metrics than some "optimum", but that is much less sensitive to a p otential negative occurrence.
• "Portfolio Management" is a popular term in Oil and Gas economic evaluation at present, and has been given a variety of definitions. Some use it to describe virtually any method to compare the relative attractiveness of investments, while others consider that any variation from the "Portfolio Selection" work of Markowitz 1 invalidates a portfolio management procedure. Our definition falls between these extremes, and will be detailed in the next section.
We will be looking at two examples of using portfolio management techniques to arrive at alternate portfolios that are better equipped to absorb a feared event.
The first example will consider the failure, during the coming year, of a very large exploration prospect. This project is large enough in relation to the other prospects that the expected value of its reserves forms a significant part of the portfolio reserve-adds for the two subsequent years. Its failure requires an immediate reshuffling of the portfolio. In this case, the "insurance" will entail identifying those options that need to be kept live, and continuing to invest pre-drilling funds in them, even though they were not a part of the initially selected portfolio.
The second example looks at the possible loss of a division two years in the future. Portfolio analysis is used to find an alternate to the "optimum" portfolio that allows acceptable performance should this event occur and still meets all the company's initial targets if it does not occur. "Insurance" here consists of a modified investment program with a slightly lower NPV.
Portfolio Management
Our industry is still evolving a definition of portfolio management. At a minimum, the term should refer to a method that makes the performance of the entire collection of projects (the portfolio) the primary unit of planning or decision-making, while leaving the performance of the individual projects as a secondary consideration. Portfolio management is not a roll-up or a ranking exercise. In portfolio management, project selection is driven by the company's desired performance across multiple metrics. In a roll-up or ranking exercise, the company's performance is driven by the project economics submitted.
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that a portfolio model: answer-generating tool. The model aids in understanding the relationships among targets, projects, risk and value, and is useful in finding ways to best exploit those relationships. 8. Given stochastic project input, allows the calculation of the probabilities of achieving each metric target, and the associated confidence intervals, for each specified year. A target achieved on an expected value basis can still have quite a low probability of being achieved in a given year. Knowledge of the probability level associated with each metric target is an important and often ignored planning tool.
For a more complete description of this portfolio management process, see Howell and Tyler 2 , DuBois 3 , or Allan 4 . alternative investments."
Expected Value Discussion
Expected value is a concept that has been used in our industry for at least 30 years 5 . In an expected value analysis, the outcomes (NPV, production volumes, reserves, earnings, etc.) associated with success of a project are multiplied by their chance of occurrence, and the outcomes associated with failure are multiplied by the chance of failure. As many descriptions of success and failure can be used as desired, as long as all the probabilities sum to 100%. The products are summed together to arrive at the expected value of the project, and the expected values of all the company's projects are summed together to arrive at the expected value of the portfolio.
For example, assume a project has a 40% chance of success, and the estimated NPV of the project if successful is $100. Also assume that there is a 60% chance of failure, and that the anticipated cost of failure is $-10. In this case, the project's NPV is .4(100) + .6(-10) = $34.
Expected value is a useful and valid concept that allows risky data to be summed up and projected on a portfolio-wide basis.
However, the requirement that there be sufficient trials within the evaluation period, in relation to the size and riskiness of the projects, is often ignored. When one or a few projects are especially large in relation to the others, or when there is a low probability of a very negative outcome in one of these projects, expected value analysis can obscure an outcome that can have quite negative implications for the company.
Simple Example.
As a simple example, consider the portfolio shown in Table 1 : Table 1-Simple Example Data Projects A through J are exploratory prospects, while Project K the base production associated with a division. Project K is assumed to be risk free. In this case, if we run a Monte Carlo simulation on the entire portfolio, the distribution of outcomes shown in However, if a 5% chance of losing the division base due to political turmoil is introduced, the probability distribution will look like the dashed line in Figure 2 . Note that the dashed line is covered by the solid line for a substantial portion of the distribution: There is now a chance of substantial loss, shown where the two lines diverge. This is not at all surprising, given the risk that has been introduced. What is interesting is the relatively small change in expected value that this possible disaster causes. The statistics from the two distributions are shown in Introducing 5% risk to the base production has dropped the mean of the distribution 5%, and the median 1%. The doubling of the standard deviation starts to give a clue about the potential difference in the two cases. Still, based on normal expected value analysis, the introduction of a small amount of risk to the base production would not alter portfolio selections.
Portfolio Insurance Method
How might we find ways to make our portfolio less sensitive to a perceived threat that may not be sufficiently characterized by the expected value? We need a different strategy than that used for "standard" portfolio analysis, in which we test project selections against the company's metric targets on an expected value basis, take risk into account in formulating the e fficient frontier and the probability of achieving annual metrics, and choose the best portfolio based on value, risk, and probability.
The portfolio model can be used in many more ways than simply finding this "optimum" portfolio. When approached in an investigative manner instead of dogmatically, portfolio analysis is a marvelous way to quickly investigate all sorts of questions and scenarios.
We will look at two slightly different procedures for finding portfolios with a level of "insurance" built in: one in which the feared event will occur, (if it occurs) in the near term, and we don't have the option of changing preceding investments, and one in which the feared event will occur (if it occurs) in the medium term, and we can alter investment strategy now to prepare for the future.
Short Preparation Time Procedure
A procedure for finding a portfolio that can recover from a given event in the near future using a portfolio model follows: In this short-term view, we will be seeing what performance might look like should the feared event occur, and we will see if we can plan what we might do to recover. We need to ensure that the appropriate options are either retained or generated, even though they will not be used if the feared event does not occur.
Example 1 Short Preparation Time
An example follows which will illustrate this procedure.
In this example, the pool of opportunities available to us is shown in Table 3 .
• The first column identifies each opportunity as being a "Base" project (existing production) or an Exploration project.
• The second column shows the chance of success. For this simple example, a bimodal probability is used-one description each of failure and success.
• The third column details the expected value of the NPV for each project.
• The fourth column shows how many of each type of project can be chosen in a year.
• The fifth column shows how many times the type project can be chosen over a seven-year period.
So, for instance, the company can drill up to four Deep Water exploration projects in a given year, but only a total of 15 over seven years. Those prospects are taken at their "typical" interest, which results in an expected NPV of $39 MM, at a success rate of 25%.
Table 3 Example Data
If a portfolio is chosen using standard techniques, the selection grid in Table 4 (shown at the end of the paper) results:
This grid of selections is the highest NPV portfolio that achieves certain metric targets. Those targets are shown as the dark bars in Figure 3 . Each factor shown in Table 4 represents a project of the type described in the left hand column being chosen that number of times. Note that for the purposes of this analysis, we will be using the maximum NPV portfolio, the value endpoint of the efficient frontier. The analysis could have been performed for any point along the efficient frontier, but the explanations would be more complicated, with no associated advantage in understanding the method.
A more complete understanding of the situation can be had by looking at some of the probabilities associated with each of the goal bars shown. This is shown in Figure 4 . In this graphic, the line above the expected value line is the P10 value of for that metric (the value which will be exceeded only 10% of the time), and the line below the expected value line is the P90 value (the value that will be exceeded 90% of the time.).
Note that the spread between the P10 and the P90 lines tends to increase with time. This is to be expected, as uncertainty grows as more and more uncertain events (drilling the prospects) occur through time. This contributes to a cumulative effect.
Figure 4 Example 1, Probabilities Added
Returning to the Opportunity pool (Table 3) note that the Norway project is quite large relative to the rest of the exploration projects. When taken as an expected value it contributes significantly to the portfolio. Let's see what happens to the portfolio if it fails. To make the model reflect this, we simply make the probability of failure 100%. When we do this without reoptimizing, the performance shown in Figure 5 results.
Figure 5 Example 1, Norway Fails
In Figure 5 , the probability scale from the previous Figure 4 has been retained, so we can see how much of the uncertainty was due to the Norway project. Because production associated with the Norway project has a long lead-time, the production based (or influenced) metrics are not much affected in the short time frame shown. Capital requirements drop to very close to the original P90 value, however, as do Reserves and Debt/Equity Ratio.
In the context of this paper, the loss of reserves, from an expected value of 235 MMBOE to 170 MMBOE, or a shortfall in year 5 of 65 MMBOE constitutes a material shortfall of the target for this size of company.
Of course, once the Norway project fails, the company is not locked into the same program that it had before it failed. If they can look at a playout of that future before the Norway project is drilled, they can prepare to address it. Keeping those options alive might have some associated cost, but that cost would be small when compared with the potential loss that is feared.
In this case, if the Norway project made to fail, and the model reoptimized from year 2 forward, the selections shown in Table 5 result: Table 6 is helpful in interpreting this result. In it, dark (black) numbers represent an increase in the number of that type project taken in the year indicated. Light (red) numbers indicate a decrease in that type project in the year indicated. A blank cell indicates no change in the number chosen.
Looking at Table 6 , it becomes obvious that the response to failure in Norway is to drill more Shelf, Deep Water, and PSC projects in the years immediately following the failure, and less GC Onshore projects. Notice that no projects were dropped in year two. This is because capital is actually freed up by the failure at Norway. Reserves do not rise to the level that was at in the original plan, but they meet the goal. NPV of the overall portfolio drops somewhat, from 4007 to 3887. Other goals are met without too much difficulty.
What was the cost of insurance in this case? The company had to be ready to execute a different plan if Norway failed. This included keeping options open for a couple of international ventures and developing a number of shelf opportunities that would not have been funded had Norway succeeded.
Interestingly, the expected value analysis also hides a number of issues if the Norway project is successful. Because the project when successful uses capital intensely in the short term but delivers most of its performance in the medium term, a successful project at Norway causes a crisis in the Debt/Equity metric. More money is spent than is taken in the short term. On the other hand, Reserves, Production, and Earnings do quite well in the success scenario. Performance after success is shown in In forming the portfolio, Debt/Equity was managed on an expected value basis, but twice as much capital is needed for a successful Norway project. This leads to violation of the Debt/Eqity target. Had there been a number of Norway sized prospects, the expected value number would have given a representitive number to plan around, but the size and uniqueness of the project in this portfolio means we need to manage it more carefully.
If the Norway project were to succeed, a number of options would be open to the owner, including laying-off interest, project financing, reducing the subsequent portfolio, etc. The important thing is that success and its implications are easy to model and to plan for, if those implications are understood.
Medium Preparation Time Procedure
The "insurance" investigated in the last example consisted of leaving options open, so that the company could react quickly to either a major success or failure. Some potential events might loom so large that a change in investment behavior is warranted before the event occurs. A procedure for finding a portfolio that is less sensitive to a given event when there is sufficient lead-time is given below: 
Example 2: Medium Preparation Time
An example of a medium-term problem follows:
The opportunity pool is the same as in the shortterm example, except that the probability of success for the Norway project has been reduced to 25% to lessen its impact. In this case, the event being investigated is a possible loss of a producing division in the third year. In other words, there is full contribution in year two, but no contribution in year three. While this is rather a severe scenario, it is not unthinkable in several regions of the world due to war, political or economic upheaval, etc.
The question we are asking here is: "Are there modifications that an be made to the "optimum" portfolio that will insulate it from this unlikely but significant event? The portfolio, including the division in question, has the expected value performance shown in No "re-optimization" of the portfolio was possible, either point forward or for the entire investment window, which allowed all of the goals to be met without the division. Therefore, absent (in this example) the ability to bring new project types into the mix, a set of "fall back" goals had to be formulated. This means that, should the division be lost, reduced performance had to be accepted, but the reduced performance would be managed so that it minimized the adverse impact on the company. Using model runs to investigate possible scenarios, the following set of fall-backs were formulated:
• Production Growth-Reduced from 10% per year to 5% per year • Reserve Growth-Reduced from 4% per year to 2% per year • ROCE-5-year target reduced from 5% to 3% • Debt/Equity-10% 5 -year reduction reduced to flat performance Given these modified goals, and the loss of the division, the performance shown in Figure 10 can be achieved. Production, earnings, and debt performance all are improved over that shown in Figure 9 , while ROCE performance is smoothed out. It is not important here that these specific fallback goals were achieved; what is important is that performance can be shaped to the company's needs with proper planning. This performance was achieved by altering the investment profile as shown in Table 7 (shown at the end of the paper):
Essentially, some of the Norway project was postponed two years, while the Shelf program was strengthened considerably in the near term.
What is the impact of these changes on the portfolio if the division is not lost? To investigate this, we merely hold the portfolio selections constant while we turn the division performance beyond year two back on. The portfolio performance, compared with the original goals, is shown in Figure 11 : This new "insured" portfolio has a slightly reduced NPV ($3935 MM vs. $3942 MM), but it attains all the original goals, even exceeding the original portfolio in earnings and debt performance. The insurance cost here can be considered the difference in NPV between the cases with no division loss, which is $7 MM or 0.2%.
Conclusion
This paper presents a method for analyzing portfolios to investigate the effects of "disasters", and to find ways to alter the portfolio to mitigate these effects. This is accomplished by locking projects into the portfolio, forcing them to fail, and letting the optimization engine find the best portfolio to achieve performance goals given those new boundary conditions. The actions taken or options left open to maximize chances of achieving these goals should the negative event occur have a cost. This cost is the insurance "premium." While this method should be an effective addition to the strategic planning and option generation toolbox, its illustration is more important as an example of how to use portfolio models to investigate questions beyond the rote generation of Efficient Frontiers. Portfolio Management is most useful as a thinking tool. If we simply follow an instruction manual to arrive at a capital allocation scheme, we have failed to realize the potential of this valuable technology. Tables   Table 3 Example Data   Table 4 : Example 1, Original Portfolio Selection Table 5 Example 1 "Insured" Portfolio Selection Table 6 Differences Table 4 and Table 5 Table 7 Example 2, Differences Starting and "Insured" 
